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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
determined that the "Standards of Per formance for 
Petroleum Refineries," promulgated under the Clean Air Act 
and codified at 40 C.F.R. SS 60.100-60.109 (1999) (Subpart 
J), applied to two stationary gas turbines located in an 
electrical power plant complex in Delaware City, Delaware. 
The petitioners challenge this determination. Because we 
conclude that the stationary gas turbines at issue in this 
case are not "in" a "petroleum r efinery," we hold that these 
turbines are not "affected facilities" as defined at 40 C.F.R. 
S 60.100(a) and therefore ar e not subject to regulation 
under the "Standards of Perfor mance for Petroleum 
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Refineries." For that reason, the EP A erred in determining 
that these performance standards ar e applicable to the gas 
turbines at issue in this case. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
Petitioners, Motiva Enterprises, LLC, and Texaco, Inc., 
challenge a final agency action, issued on July 21, 1998, by 
the Environmental Protection Agency.2 This final action, 
entitled "New Source Performance Standards Subpart J 
Applicability Determination for the Star Enterprise 
Petroleum Refinery in Delaware City, Delaware," set forth 
the EPA's conclusion that two stationary gas turbines, 
owned by Motiva and located in an electrical power plant 
complex adjacent to Motiva's petroleum r efinery in 
Delaware City, are subject to regulation under the New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for Petroleum 
Refineries, codified at 40 C.F.R. SS 60.100-60.109. 
 
Before addressing the merits of the petitioners' challenge, 
we will discuss the relevant regulatory framework. The 
emission of sulfur dioxide (SO2), which causes acid rain 
and has serious adverse health effects, particularly among 
asthmatics, is regulated by the EPA under the Clean Air 
Act. See, e.g., American Lung Ass'n v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 134 F.3d 388, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
S 7411, authorizes the EPA to pr omulgate performance 
standards for new and modified sources of pollution that 
the EPA concludes cause or significantly contribute to air 
pollution. See 42 U.S.C. S 7411(b) (2000). These standards, 
the NSPS's, must: 
 
       [R]eflect[ ] the degree of emission limitation achievable 
       through the application of the best system of emission 
       reduction which (taking into account the cost of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On October 1, 1998, all assets of Star Enterprise, including the 
facilities at issue in this case, were transferred to Motiva. Petitioners 
filed 
a motion on July 15, 1999, to formally substitute Motiva for Star 
Enterprise in this litigation. The motion was unopposed and was 
granted. Thus, Motiva and Texaco became the petitioners and parties of 
interest. We refer to both Motiva and Star throughout this opinion as 
appropriate. 
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       achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health 
       and environmental impact and energy r equirements) 
       the Administrator determines has been adequately 
       demonstrated. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 7411(a)(1) (2000). NSPS's apply only to "affected 
facilities" that were constructed, modified or reconstructed 
after the publication of the applicable proposed regulation.3 
Each NSPS explicitly defines and describes the"affected 
facilities" to which it applies. 
 
The EPA has issued NSPS's for over 70 "sour ce" 
categories. Most of these NSPS's relate to specific industries 
such as glass manufacturing, see 40 C.F .R. SS 60.290- 
60.296 (1999), nitric acid manufacturing, see  40 C.F.R. 
SS 60.70-60.74 (1999), ferroalloy pr oduction, see 40 C.F.R. 
SS 60.260-60.266 (1999), copper smelting, see 40 C.F.R. 
SS 60.160-60.166 (1999), and the NSPS at issue here, 
Subpart J, petroleum refining, see  40 C.F.R. SS 60.100- 
60.109 (1999). The EPA has also issued NSPS's for generic 
source categories. These generic source NSPS's apply to 
specific types of industrial equipment regar dless of the 
purpose for which the equipment is used. Examples of 
generic source categories include incinerators, see 40 
C.F.R. SS 60.50-60.54 (1999), r ecently constructed fossil- 
fuel-fired steam generators, see 40 C.F.R. SS 60.40-60.46 
(1999), and stationary gas turbines, see 40 C.F.R. 
SS 60.330-60.335 (1999) (Subpart GG).4 
 
NSPS Subpart J, "Standards of Perfor mance for 
Petroleum Refineries," was designed to r educe SO2 
emissions from petroleum refineries. As set forth in 
S 60.100, the provisions of Subpart J"are applicable to the 
following affected facilities in petroleum refineries: fluid 
catalytic cracking unit catalyst regenerators, fuel gas 
combustion devices, and all Claus sulfur r ecovery plants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See 40 C.F.R. S 60.1(a) (1999) ("[T]he provisions of this part apply to 
the owner or operator of any stationary sour ce which contains an 
affected facility, the construction or modification of which is commenced 
after the date of publication in this part of any standard (or, if 
earlier, 
the date of publication of any proposed standar d) applicable to that 
facility."). 
 
4. See supra Part IV C for further on Subpart GG. 
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except Claus plants of 20 long tons per day (L TD) or less." 
40 C.F.R. S 60.100(a) (1999) (emphasis added). Subpart J 
goes on to define a "petroleum refinery" as "any facility 
engaged in producing gasoline, kerosene, distillate fuel oils, 
residual fuel oils, lubricants, or other pr oducts through 
distillation of petroleum or through r edistillation, cracking 
or reforming of unfinished petr oleum derivatives." 40 C.F.R. 
S 60.101(a) (1999). At issue in this case ar e two stationary 
gas turbines, turbines that the EPA contends are "fuel gas 
combustion devices" and thus "affected facilities" (as set 
forth in S 60.100(a)), subject to regulation under Subpart J.5 
 
The EPA initially proposed the NSPS for petroleum 
refineries in 1973 and issued the corr esponding final 
regulation, what is now Subpart J, on Mar ch 8, 1974. 
Recognizing that petroleum refineries pr ocess numerous 
gases that contain significant amounts of hydr ogen sulfide 
(H2S) and that the uncontr olled combustion of these gases 
resulted in significant SO2 emissions, the EPA's primary 
goal in promulgating Subpart J was the r eduction of SO2 
emissions from petroleum refineries. Subpart J prohibits 
the owner or operator of a "fuel gas combustion device" 
located in a petroleum refinery fr om combusting any "fuel 
gas" that contains H2S in excess of 230 milligrams per dry 
standard cubic meter. See 40 C.F .R. S 60.104(a)(1). 
Compliance with this standard can be established either by 
monitoring the amount of H2S in the fuel being burned or 
by monitoring the amount of SO2 emitted from the fuel gas 
combustion device in question.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The term "fuel gas combustion device" is defined in Subpart J as "any 
equipment, such as process heaters, boilers andflares used to combust 
fuel gas, except facilities in which gases ar e combusted to produce 
sulfur 
or sulfuric acid." 40 C.F.R. S 60.101(g) (1999). The term "fuel gas" is 
further defined in Subpart J as "any gas which is generated at a 
petroleum refinery and which is combusted." 40 C.F.R. S 60.101(d) 
(1999). 
6. In October 1990, the EPA established an"SO2 equivalence level" to 
allow regulated entities to monitor the amount of SO2 emitted after 
combustion in lieu of monitoring the amount of H 2S in the "fuel gas" 
prior to combustion. See 40 C.F.R.S 60.105(a)(3)(ii) (1999). Based on the 
investigation "of typical fuel gas compositions and their combustion 
products," the EPA determined that the "SO2 equivalence level" set forth 
in S 60.105(a)(3)(ii) (20 parts per million (ppm), dry basis, zero percent 
excess air) was equivalent to an H2S level of 230 milligrams per dry 
standard cubic meter. 55 Fed. Reg. 40,171, 40,172 (Oct. 2, 1990). 
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Consistent with the goal of reducing SO2 emissions from 
petroleum refineries, the definition of "fuel gas" in Subpart 
J was modified on two separate occasions to exclude gases 
that do not contain significant amounts of H2S. Originally, 
in 1974, "fuel gas" was defined as "any gas which is 
generated by a petroleum refinery pr ocess unit and which 
is combusted, including any gaseous mixture of natural gas 
and fuel gas which is combusted." 39 Fed. Reg. 9308, 9315 
(Mar. 8, 1974). In March 1979, the EP A modified the 
definition of "fuel gas" to include: 
 
       [N]atural gas or any gas generated by a petr oleum 
       refinery process unit which is combusted separately or 
       in any combination. Fuel gas does not include gases 
       generated by catalytic cracking unit catalyst 
       regenerators and fluid coking unit coke bur ners. 
 
44 Fed. Reg. 13,480, 13,481 (Mar. 12, 1979). The definition 
was changed in 1979 to explicitly exclude gases generated 
by "catalytic cracking unit catalyst regenerators and fluid 
coking unit coke burners" because such gases do not 
contain significant amounts of H2S. 
 
By changing the definition of "fuel gas" in 1979, the EPA 
arguably brought within the scope of the regulation natural 
gas produced off-site and transported to a petroleum 
refinery via pipeline. The EPA had not intended to subject 
such natural gas to regulation under Subpart J because 
natural gas transported to a petroleum r efinery via pipeline 
contains only trace amounts of H2S due to specifications 
established to minimize pipeline corrosion. See 45 Fed. Reg. 
13,991, 13,991 (March 3, 1980). The EPA, however, did 
intend to regulate natural gas that was both pr oduced and 
combusted on-site at a petroleum refinery: 
 
       In a few cases, however, a refinery may [itself] generate 
       natural gas. There may be no legal or technical 
       requirement that this gas be desulfurized before 
       combustion. If this gas contains appreciable hydrogen 
       sulfide and sulfur constituents, significant emissions of 
       sulfur dioxide would result when it is bur ned. The 
       existing standards of performance were intended to 
       cover these types of gases. 
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Id. The EPA further noted that the"intent of the existing 
standards of performance for r efinery fuel gas has always 
been to prevent the emissions of sulfur dioxide resulting 
from the burning of gaseous fuels containing hydrogen 
sulfide." Id. To clarify this distinction (the distinction 
between natural gas produced on-site at a petr oleum 
refinery and natural gas transported fr om an off-site 
location via pipeline), the EPA proposed revising the first 
sentence of the definition of "fuel gas" to read: " `Fuel gas' 
means natural gas generated at a petroleum r efinery or any 
gas generated by a refinery process unit, which is 
combusted separately or in any combination with any type 
of natural gas." Id. The EPA ultimately received several 
comments indicating that this proposed language was 
confusing because gases produced at a r efinery were not 
generally considered "natural gas" even if their chemical 
composition was similar to that of natural gas. See 45 Fed. 
Reg. 79,452, 79,453 (Dec. 1, 1980). In response to these 
comments, the EPA modified the definition of fuel gas one 
last time to include "any gas which is generated at a 
petroleum refinery and which is combusted." Id. The EPA 
indicated that this final definition was meant to encompass 
"any gas which has the composition of natural gas." Id. 
 
The stationary gas turbines at issue in this case ar e to be 
located in an existing electrical power plant complex 
adjacent to the Motiva petroleum refinery in Delaware City. 
This power plant complex was originally owned and 
operated by Delmarva Power & Light Company.7 At the time 
of its construction in the mid-1950's, Delmarva entered into 
an agreement with Star, Motiva's pr edecessor in interest, to 
provide steam and electricity to Star's adjacent petroleum 
refinery. Delmarva owned and operated the power plant for 
35 years. In January 1989, Star exercised its option to 
purchase the power plant from Delmarva, and actual 
ownership of the power plant was transferred in January 
1992. Following the transfer of ownership, ther e was no 
change in the purpose or operation of the power plant, and 
Delmarva has continued to operate the power plant. In 
connection with its acquisition of the power plant complex, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In 2000, Delmarva changed its name to Conectiv. In this opinion, 
however, we will continue to refer to the company as Delmarva. 
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Star entered into an agreement with Delmarva to supply 
electrical power on demand to the Delmarva power grid 
from one of the boilers in the power plant. 
 
The stationary gas turbines are part of a lar ger project 
being designed and constructed within the existing power 
plant complex in Delaware City. This pr oject, known as the 
Repowering Project, is designed to replace and/or upgrade 
certain existing power plant units at the power plant 
complex. Once operational, the Repowering Pr oject will 
convert high-sulfur petroleum coke produced at Motiva's 
adjacent petroleum refinery into synthesis gas, which will 
then be burned in the stationary gas turbines at issue to 
produce steam and electricity. The steam and electricity will 
power Motiva's adjacent petroleum refinery; excess 
electricity will be sold to Delmarva and others on the 
commercial power grid. 
 
On July 17, 1997, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. S 60.5, Star 
requested a determination of Subpart J nonapplicability 
from the EPA Region III office. In essence, Star asked the 
EPA to issue a ruling stating that Subpart J does not apply 
to the Repowering Project's stationary gas turbines. 
Approximately one year later, the EP A responded by issuing 
an action entitled "New Source Perfor mance Standards 
Subpart J Applicability Determination for the Star 
Enterprise Petroleum Refinery in Delawar e City, Delaware" 
in which the EPA concluded that Subpart J applies to 
Motiva's Repowering Project, and, more specifically, applies 
to the two stationary gas turbines that are part of the 
Repowering Project and will burn synthesis gas to produce 
steam and generate electricity. In reaching its conclusion, 
the EPA relied primarily on three facts: (1) the power plant 
that houses the Repowering Project is adjacent to Motiva's 
petroleum refinery, (2) the Repowering Project will provide 
electricity and steam to the Motiva's adjacent petr oleum 
refinery, and (3) Motiva owns not only the electrical power 
plant complex which houses the Repowering Pr oject but 
also the Repowering Project itself and the adjacent 
petroleum refinery.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The EPA also determined that because the aforementioned "synthesis 
gas," which was to be combusted in the stationary gas turbines at issue 
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The EPA's determination was initially communicated not 
to Star but to the EPA Region III office. When Star learned 
of EPA's decision, it sought to withdraw its r equest for a 
determination of nonapplicability. However , the State of 
Delaware asked the EPA for a final determination because 
certain conditions to the issuance of a state construction 
permit were based on EPA's decision that Subpart J was 
applicable to the two stationary gas turbines. 
 
The EPA finalized its determination on July 21, 1998, 
and Star timely filed petitions for review with both this 
Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. On January 19, 1999, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the 
EPA's motion to dismiss on venue grounds. The petition 
then proceeded before us. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
We have appellate jurisdiction over this petition for review 
pursuant to S 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 7607(b)(1) (2000). Moreover, we note that despite earlier 
concerns about the justiciability of the pr esent controversy, 
we are now persuaded that all the necessary pr erequisites 
to adjudicating this dispute have been met. Indeed, it is 
undisputed by the parties that the EPA deter mination at 
issue is a final agency action, see, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 
520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997),9 that the EPA determination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
in this case, was generated "at" a petr oleum refinery, this gas was a 
"fuel 
gas" as defined in Subpart J. See 40 C.F.R. S 60.101(d) (1999). The 
parties to this action argue extensively as to whether the "synthesis gas" 
burned in these stationary gas turbines is indeed "fuel gas" and as to 
whether the stationary gas turbines at issue ar e "fuel gas combustion 
devices" as these terms are defined in Subpart J. As discussed infra, we 
hold today that Subpart J is inapplicable to the stationary gas turbines 
at issue in this case because the turbines ar e not located "in" a 
"petroleum refinery." We therefore need not reach the question of 
whether the "synthesis gas" burned in these stationary gas turbines is a 
"fuel gas" or whether these turbines ar e "fuel gas combustion devices" as 
these terms are defined in Subpart J. 
 
9. As the Supreme Court noted in Bennett : 
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at issue is ripe for review, see, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. 
Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998),10 and that at least 
one of the petitioners, Motiva, has standing to challenge the 
EPA's determination, see, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       [T]wo conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be "final": 
       First, the action must mark the "consummation" of the agency's 
       decisionmaking process, Chicago & Souther n Air Lines, Inc. v. 
       Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)--it must not be of 
       a merely tentative or interlocutory natur e. And second, the action 
       must be one by which "rights or obligations have been determined," 
       or from which "legal consequences will flow," Port of Boston Marine 
       Terminal Ass'n. v. Rederiaktiebolaget T ransatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 
71 
       (1970). 
 
Bennett, 520 U.S. 177-78. As the parties concede, and as the facts 
detailed above clearly indicate, the two conditions set forth in Bennett 
have been met. Thus, the EPA's determination is a final agency action 
and is reviewable by this Court. 
 
10. As the Supreme Court stated in Ohio Forestry: 
 
       In deciding whether an agency's decision is, or is not, ripe for 
       judicial review, the Court has examined both the "fitness of the 
       issues for judicial decision" and the "har dship to the parties of 
       withholding court consideration." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
       387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). To do so in this case, we must consider: 
       (1) whether delayed review would cause har dship to the plaintiffs, 
       (2) whether judicial intervention would inappr opriately interfere 
with 
       further administrative action, and (3) whether the courts would 
       benefit from further factual development of the issues presented. 
 
Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733. As the parties concede, and as the facts 
detailed above clearly indicate, evaluation of the three factors 
delineated 
in Ohio Forestry clearly demonstrates that the EPA's determination is 
ripe for judicial review. 
 
11. As the Supreme Court held in Lujan : 
 
       Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible 
       constitutional minimum of standing contains thr ee elements. First, 
       the plaintiff must have suffered an"injury in fact"--an invasion of 
       a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized 
       and (b) "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.' " 
       Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
A necessary precursor to determining the appropriate 
standard of review in this case is deter mining whether the 
agency action in question is an "interpretive rule" or a 
"legislative rule." Although petitioners contend that the 
EPA's determination is an "interpr etive rule" rather than a 
"legislative rule," and thus that the deter mination is 
entitled to little or no judicial deference, we conclude that 
the EPA's determination is a legislative rule. See, e.g., 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F .2d 901, 904-05 
(7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); National-Southwire Aluminum Co. 
v. EPA, 838 F.2d 835, 838, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1988); Potomac 
Elec. Power Co. v. EPA, 650 F.2d 509, 513 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 
An agency determination is a "rule" under the 
Administrative Procedure Act if it is a"statement of general 
or particular applicability and future ef fect [and] designed 
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . ." Dia 
Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1263 (3d Cir. 
1994) (quoting 5 U.S.C. S 551(4)). Such a"rule" may be an 
"interpretive rule" or a "legislative rule." Id. at 1264. As we 
stated in Dia: 
 
       If the rule is based on specific statutory pr ovisions, and 
       its validity stands or falls on the correctness of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the conduct complained of--the injury has to be"fairly . . . 
       trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . 
. 
       th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not 
before 
       the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely 
       "speculative," that the injury will be "r edressed by a favorable 
       decision." 
 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. As the parties concede, and as the facts detailed 
above clearly indicate, the three requir ements set forth in Lujan have 
been met with respect to Motiva. Because Motiva has standing to bring 
suit, we need not reach the question of whether Texaco has met the 
necessary constitutional and/or prudential standing requirements. See, 
e.g., Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. 
River 
Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 303-05 (1983); V illage of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 & n.9 (1977). See 
generally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (constitutional standing); Hazardous 
Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 921-27 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (prudential standing). 
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       agency's interpretation of those provisions, it is an 
       interpretive rule. If, however, the rule is based on an 
       agency's power to exercise its judgment as to how best 
       to implement a general statutory mandate, the rule is 
       likely a legislative one. 
 
Id. (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719- 
20 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 
Courts will reject an agency's interpretive rule if it is 
contrary to clear congressional intent. See Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 n.9 (1984); American Ambulance Serv. v. Sullivan, 
911 F.2d 901, 908 (3d Cir. 1990). If a statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to congressional intent, courts 
must defer to an agency's determination if the 
determination is consistent with a per missible construction 
of the statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45; see Beatty 
v. Danri Corp., 49 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir . 1995). "Varying 
degrees of deference are accor ded to administrative 
interpretations, based on such factors as the timing and 
consistency of the agency's position, and the natur e of its 
expertise," Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 
(1977), and an interpretive rule is not binding on the 
agency or this Court, see Armstead v. United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 815 F.2d 
278, 282 (3d Cir. 1987). In contrast, a legislative rule, an 
agency's interpretation of its own regulation, is "controlling 
unless `plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.' " Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) 
(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)); see Beatty, 49 F .3d at 997; 
Rodriguez v. Reading Hous. Auth., 8 F.3d 961, 965 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
Although the Third Circuit has yet to r eview an EPA 
determination under the Clean Air Act, the Fourth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have engaged in 
such review, with all three Circuits concluding that 
Congress, through the Clean Air Act, dir ected the EPA to 
promulgate New Source Perfor mance Standards. See 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 904-905; National- 
Southwire Aluminum Co., 838 F.2d at 838, 841-42; Potomac 
Elec. Power Co., 650 F.2d at 513. The Fourth and Seventh 
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Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that EP A 
determinations made with respect to New Source 
Performance Standards are controlling unless plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation at issue. See 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 893 F.2d at 907; Potomac Elec. 
Power Co., 650 F.2d at 513. The Sixth Cir cuit, in contrast, 
has held that EPA determinations made with respect to 
New Source Performance Standar ds are controlling unless 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discr etion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law." National-Southwire Aluminum 
Co., 838 F.2d at 836. 
 
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act provides: 
 
       The Administrator shall . . . publish (and fr om time to 
       time thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of 
       stationary sources. He shall include a category of 
       sources in such list if in his judgment it causes, or 
       contributes significantly to, air pollution which may 
       reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
       welfare. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 7411(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Section 111 
further provides: 
 
       Within one year [of making a list accor ding to the 
       above provision], the Administrator shall publish 
       proposed regulations, establishing Federal standards of 
       performance for new sources within such category. . . . 
       [After opportunity is given for public comments and the 
       comments are considered], he shall pr omulgate . . . 
       such standards with such modifications as he deems 
       appropriate. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 7411(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 
These provisions clearly indicate that the EP A was 
directed by Congress to promulgate r egulations necessary 
to implement the Clean Air Act. Thus, we conclude that 
EPA determinations interpreting New Source Performance 
Standards, once handed down, constitute "legislative rules." 
Consistent with our reasoning in Dia, as well as with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and opinions in the Fourth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, the EPA 
determination at issue in this case is a "legislative rule," 
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and therefore must be upheld unless plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with Subpart J. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Beatty, 49 F.3d at 997; Rodriguez, 8 
F.3d at 965. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Subpart J & "Affected Facilities in Petroleum 
       Refineries" 
 
As detailed above, each New Source Perfor mance 
Standard promulgated under the Clean Air Act applies to 
specific "affected facilities," and each New Source 
Performance Standard explicitly sets forth and defines the 
"affected facility" or "affected facilities" to which it applies. 
Consistent with this regulatory framework, Subpart J 
states in relevant part: 
 
       The provisions of this subpart are applicable to the 
       following affected facilities in petr oleum refineries: fluid 
       catalytic cracking unit catalyst regenerators, fuel gas 
       combustion devices, and all Claus sulfur recovery 
       plants except Claus plants of 20 long tons per day 
       (LTD) or less. The Claus sulfur recovery plant need not 
       be physically located within the boundaries of a 
       petroleum refinery to be an affected facility, provided it 
       processes gases produced within a petr oleum refinery. 
 
See 40 C.F.R. S 60.100(a) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 
In determining that the stationary gas turbines located at 
Motiva's Repowering Project are fuel gas combustion 
devices subject to regulation under Subpart J, the EPA 
concluded that the turbines are "affected facilities" as 
defined by 40 C.F.R. S 60.100(a). However, as 40 C.F.R. 
S 60.100(a) expressly indicates, Subpart J does not apply to 
all "fuel gas combustion devices," but rather applies only to 
"fuel gas combustion devices" located "in petroleum 
refineries." Thus, the key question, upon which the 
outcome of this petition hinges, is: Are the stationary gas 
turbines here "in" a "petroleum r efinery?" 
 
Subpart J defines a "petroleum refinery" as "any facility 
engaged in producing gasoline, kerosene, distillate fuel oils, 
residual fuel oils, lubricants, or other pr oducts through 
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distillation of petroleum or through r edistillation, cracking 
or reforming of unfinished petr oleum derivatives." 40 C.F.R. 
S 60.101(a) (1999). While the EPA r eadily concedes that the 
Repowering Project and the larger electrical power plant 
complex, in which the Repowering Project is located, are 
not a "petroleum refinery,"12 the EPA nonetheless contends 
that the Repowering Project's two stationary gas turbines 
are "in" a "petroleum refinery" and are subject to regulation 
under Subpart J. 
 
In originally determining that the stationary gas turbines 
are subject to regulation under Subpart J, the EPA stated: 
 
       Star's [Repowering] Project is located adjacent to the 
       remainder of the refinery and is under common 
       ownership and control; therefore, it is considered part 
       of the refinery. Further evidence that the[Repowering] 
       Project is integrated into refinery operations is that the 
       [Repowering] Project will supply most of the refinery's 
       steam and all power requirements, has the ability to 
       combust other fuel gas from the refinery, and . . . will 
       help Star manage its solid waste from the r efinery. 
       Because the [Repowering] Project is part of the refinery, 
       fuel gas combustion devices associated with the 
       [Repowering] Project are "in" a refinery and fuel gas 
       generated at the [Repowering] Project is generated at a 
       refinery. 
 
NSPS Subpart J Applicability Determination for the Star 
Enterprise Petroleum Refinery in Delawar e City, Delaware, 
Memorandum Dated July 21, 1998 (Star Applicability 
Determination). In short, the EPA concluded and now 
contends that because Motiva's Repowering Pr oject "is 
located adjacent to" a "[petroleum] r efinery [that] is under 
common ownership and control," it should be"considered 
part of the [adjacent] refinery," and thus that the stationary 
gas turbines at issue in this case, turbines that ar e an 
integral part of the Repowering Project, ar e "in" a 
"petroleum refinery." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. It is undisputed that Motiva's Repowering Pr oject is a cogeneration 
facility that will gasify petroleum coke and combust the resulting 
synthesis gas to generate only electricity and steam. 
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This reasoning alone cannot, however, pr ovide the basis 
for concluding that the Repowering Project's stationary gas 
turbines are subject to regulation under Subpart J. Indeed, 
were the EPA's reasoning sufficient to establish that the 
Repowering Project is part of Motiva's adjacent petroleum 
refinery, it would also be sufficient to establish that any 
independent, free-standing facility owned by Motiva and 
built on land adjacent to Motiva's petroleum r efinery is part 
of Motiva's petroleum refinery. For example, EPA's 
reasoning would also be sufficient to establish that a 
McDonald's restaurant, owned by Motiva and built on land 
adjacent to Motiva's petroleum refinery for the convenience 
of refinery workers, is part of Motiva's adjacent petroleum 
refinery. Under this interpretation, the EPA would be able 
to regulate, under Subpart J, fuel gas combustion devices 
inside the McDonald's. Even though these fuel gas 
combustion devices would not be located "in" a"petroleum 
refinery," such devices would be subject to regulation under 
Subpart J under the EPA's interpretation because they 
would be treated as "affected facilities in [a] petroleum 
refinery[ ]." 
 
Were we to accept the EPA's r easoning (assuming 
"common ownership and control"), any fuel gas combustion 
device located in a facility adjacent to Motiva's petroleum 
refinery would be subject to regulation under Subpart J 
because such devices would be treated, inappr opriately, as 
"affected facilities in [a] petr oleum refinery[ ]." This 
conclusion is untenable. 
 
As detailed above, it is undisputed that Motiva's 
Repowering Project is a cogeneration facility that will gasify 
petroleum coke and combust the resulting synthesis gas to 
generate electricity and steam. Moreover , even though 
Motiva's Repowering Project is adjacent to a petroleum 
refinery that Motiva owns, the Repowering Pr oject is located 
in a free-standing building, an electric power plant complex 
that is physically separate and distinct from Motiva's 
petroleum refinery. Neither the Repowering Project nor the 
electric power plant complex in which the Repowering 
Project is to be constructed and operated is a"petroleum 
refinery." We therefor e fail to understand how the EPA 
concluded and now contends that the Repowering Pr oject's 
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stationery gas turbines are themselves "in" a "petroleum 
refinery." Furthermore, if these turbines are not "in" a 
"petroleum refinery," they ar e not "affected facilities" and 
thus are not subject to regulation under Subpart J. 
 
The EPA also argues that the Repowering Project will be 
an integral part of the refinery's operations and for that 
reason the stationary gas turbines at issue ar e "in" a 
"petroleum refinery." The EP A asserts that: 
 
       [The Repowering Project] will take low value material 
       from the refinery, i.e., petr oleum coke, convert it into a 
       different low value material, i.e. , a combustible gas, 
       burn the gas in a combustion turbine, and use the 
       steam and electricity produced by the turbine to 
       provide energy for other refinery processes. The 
       [Repowering] Project is thus a integral part of the 
       refinery's operations both because it is part of the 
       refinery's process of manufacturing usable products 
       from crude oil and because it uses refinery products to 
       provide a valuable input, i.e. ener gy [in the form of 
       electricity and steam] to the refinery's operation. 
 
Star Applicability Determination. While much of the above is 
accurate, the Repowering Project is neither part of the 
adjacent petroleum refinery nor necessary to the refinery's 
operations. Indeed, as the EPA concedes, Motiva could as 
easily have chosen to power its refinery by purchasing 
electricity from the local electric company's commercial grid.13 
 
If we were to follow the EPA's reasoning that the 
Repowering Project is part of Motiva's adjacent petroleum 
refinery, we would also be requir ed to conclude that any 
building that is located on land adjacent to Motiva's 
petroleum refinery and has a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the petroleum refinery -- be it to provide 
food to the workers or energy to the machinery-- is part of 
the petroleum refinery. Following this r easoning, the EPA 
would be able to regulate facilities within any such building 
as if they were located "in" the petr oleum refinery. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. As we have already noted, Motiva's Repowering Project produces 
more than enough electricity to power the adjacent petroleum refinery 
and that surplus electricity will be sold to Delmarva and/or other 
customers on the commercial power grid. 
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The EPA acknowledges that the term "petroleum refinery" 
is clearly defined in Subpart J as "any facility engaged in 
producing gasoline, kerosene, distillate fuel oils, residual 
fuel oils, lubricants, or other products thr ough distillation 
of petroleum or through redistillation, cracking or reforming 
of unfinished petroleum derivatives." 40 C.F.R. S 60.101(a). 
Moreover, the EPA concedes that Motiva's Repowering 
Project is a cogeneration facility that generates only 
electricity and steam and that the Repowering Pr oject 
resides in a separate, free-standing electric power plant 
complex. The EPA also concedes that none of the processes 
described in the definition of "petroleum refinery" set forth 
in S 60.101(a) takes place as a part of the Repowering 
Project or even within the building in which the Repowering 
Project resides. Nonetheless, the EP A contends that a 
"broad definition" of "petroleum refinery" to include 
operations essential to its purpose is consistent with the 
language of Subpart J. Using this broad definition, the EPA 
concluded: 
 
       The Star [petroleum] refinery is engaged in the 
       processes described in the NSPS Subpart J definition 
       of "petroleum refinery." The [Repowering] Project is an 
       integral part of the refinery. It gasifies coke generated 
       by refinery process units, producing synthesis gas, 
       combusts the synthesis gas and is also capable of 
       combusting other types of refinery fuel gas. The sulfur 
       compounds (mainly H2S) stripped during the 
       gasification process will be sent to the modified Claus 
       sulfur recovery plant. The steam and most of the 
       electricity produced by the project will be routed back 
       to other refinery process units. 
 
Star Applicability Determination. The EPA's reasoning is 
flawed because the Repowering Project is not essential to 
the operation of Motiva's petroleum refinery. Were the 
Repowering Project essential to the operation of the 
refinery, the EPA might be able to convince us that the 
Repowering Project was part of Motiva's petr oleum refinery 
and that the stationary gas turbines located in the 
Repowering Project are "in" a "petroleum refinery." However, 
as mentioned above, Motiva does not need electricity from 
the Repowering Project to power its refinery. Motiva could 
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just as easily purchase electricity from the local power 
company. Nor is the Repowering Project necessary for coke 
disposal. Rather than using the petroleum coke, produced 
in its refinery, to power the turbines at issue here, Motiva 
could ship the coke off-site for use at other industrial 
facilities or for disposal. Indeed, because Motiva's 
petroleum refinery operated for many years prior to the 
conception of the Repowering Project, it is har d to 
understand how the EPA concludes that the Repowering 
Project is essential to the operation of the adjacent 
petroleum refinery.14Moreover, the EPA's claim that"[i]f the 
current power plant did not exist, Star would not be able to 
operate the refinery at its current capacity" is also 
inaccurate for the reasons articulated above. Presumably, 
the only limitations on refinery capacity would be 
limitations on available power and available raw materials. 
The Repowering Project in no way affects the availability of 
raw materials, and although the Repowering Pr oject would 
supply power to Motiva's petroleum refinery, Motiva could 
just easily purchase that power (and any additional power 
needed) from a commercial supplier . 
 
Finally, in support of its initial determination, the EPA 
contends that: 
 
       The coke gasification project is not a stand-alone 
       facility. . . . In Star's case, the refinery in its current 
       form could not operate without the curr ent "power 
       plant" or without the planned Project, and it is not 
       likely that the current "power plant" or planned Project 
       would exist (they certainly would not exist in their 
       current or planned form) without the r emainder of the 
       refinery. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Were we to accept the EPA's logic, if Motiva purchased electricity 
from the local electric company, generated by a generator located in a 
free-standing building on land adjacent to its petroleum refinery, and 
then, at a later date, Motiva purchased outright the entire local electric 
company, any stationary gas turbines that wer e a part of the 
aforementioned generator facility would (quite suddenly) become subject 
to regulation under Subpart J, since these turbines would be literally 
transformed into "affected facilitiesin [a] petroleum refinery[ ]." This 
sort 
of reasoning, and the outcome dictated by it, are untenable. 
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Star Applicability Determination. For the same reasons 
detailed above, this argument is unpersuasive. Put simply, 
the Repowering Project is a stand-alone facility and could 
operate absent the existence of Motiva's petr oleum refinery 
by obtaining petroleum coke from another commercial 
supplier (rather than Motiva's adjacent petr oleum refinery) 
and selling all of the steam and electricity pr oduced by the 
Repowering Project to commercial customers such as 
Delmarva. 
 
While it is undisputed that a mutually beneficial 
relationship exists between Motiva's Repowering Project and 
Motiva's petroleum refinery, the EP A's determination that 
the stationary gas turbines at Motiva's Repowering Project 
are subject to regulation under Subpart J is not only 
plainly erroneous but also inconsistent with the language of 
Subpart J itself. In short, the EPA's deter mination that the 
stationary gas turbines at Motiva's Repowering Pr oject are 
"affected facilities" subject to r egulation under Subpart J 
ignores the requirement that r egulated turbines be located 
"in" a "petroleum refinery." 
 
B. Physical Location as the Touchstone of S 60.100(a) 
 
Despite the EPA's arguments to the contrary, in 
determining what facilities are "af fected facilities" that can 
be regulated under Subpart J, and, specifically, in 
determining what facilities are "in petroleum refineries," the 
touchstone of such a determination is the physical location 
of the facilities in question. As noted above, 40 C.F.R. 
S 60.100(a) states: 
 
       The provisions of this subpart are applicable to the 
       following affected facilities in petroleum refineries: fluid 
       catalytic cracking unit catalyst regenerators, fuel gas 
       combustion devices, and all Claus sulfur recovery 
       plants except Claus plants of 20 long tons per day 
       (LTD) or less. The Claus sulfur recovery plant need not 
       be physically located within the boundaries of a 
       petroleum refinery to be an af fected facility, provided it 
       processes gases produced within a petr oleum refinery. 
 
40 C.F.R. S 60.100(a) (1999) (emphasis added). For the last 
sentence of S 60.100(a) to make any sense, the ultimate 
question to be answered when determining whether certain 
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facilities are "in petroleum refineries" must be: Where are 
the facilities physically located? 
 
Although the EPA argues strenuously that the term 
"petroleum refinery" must be interpreted broadly to include 
not only Motiva's petroleum refinery but also an adjacent, 
free-standing, independent electric power plant complex 
that produces steam and electricity for use by the refinery 
(as well as other commercial customers including the local 
power company), the stationary gas turbines in this free- 
standing, independent facility are simply not"in" a 
"petroleum refinery" because neither the Repowering Project 
nor the electric power plant complex in which the 
Repowering Project is located engages in the pr oduction of 
"gasoline, kerosene, distillate fuel oils, r esidual fuel oils, 
lubricants, or other products through distillation of 
petroleum or through redistillation, cracking or reforming of 
unfinished petroleum derivatives." 40 C.F .R. S 60.101(a) 
(1999). Moreover, the explicit inclusion in S 60.100(a) of 
Claus recovery plants "not . . . physically located within the 
boundaries of a petroleum refinery," and the corresponding 
absence of a similar inclusion with respect to"fuel gas 
combustion devices" "not . . . physically located within the 
boundaries of a petroleum refinery," further undermines 
the EPA's determination. 
 
C. Chemical Composition of Synthesis Gas Bur ned in 
       the Stationary Gas Turbines 
 
Although our determination that Subpart J does not 
apply here frees us from having to determine whether the 
synthesis gas to be burned by the stationary gas turbines 
is a "fuel gas" regulated under Subpart J, we do note that 
the chemical composition of the synthesis gas is markedly 
different from the chemical composition of other fuel gases, 
the burning of which is subject to regulation under Subpart 
J. As the petitioners highlight in their brief, and as the 
regulatory history of Subpart J suggests, the exclusive 
focus and purpose of Subpart J is the reduction of sulfur 
emissions (specifically sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions) by 
limiting the amount of hydrogen sulfide (H 2S) in 
combustible fuel gases combusted in petroleum r efineries. 
According to Motiva, a not insignificant amount of the 
sulfur/SO2, emitted when the synthesis gas at issue is 
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combusted in these turbines, comes not from H 2S in the 
synthesis gas but from COS in the synthesis gas. 
 
Regardless of the exact source of the sulfur/SO2 
emissions, it appears from the recor d that at least some of 
the sulfur/SO2 emitted when the synthesis gas at issue is 
combusted comes not from H2S in the gas but rather from 
COS in the gas. As mentioned above, compliance with 
Subpart J can be established either by measuring and 
monitoring the H2S level in the fuel gas prior to combustion 
or by measuring and monitoring the SO2  level in the 
emissions after combustion. See supra, note 4. If subject to 
regulation under Subpart J, Motiva is without a legally 
acceptable method for measuring the combined 
concentration of COS and H2S in the pre-combustion 
synthesis burned at the Repowering Project. Therefore, 
Motiva will be forced either to monitor and r educe the 
emission of SO2, or to monitor and control the level of H2S 
in the pre-combustion synthesis gas being combusted at 
the Repowering Project (rather than the level of H2S and 
COS in the pre-combustion synthesis gas), even though by 
itself, the level of H2S in the synthesis gas being combusted 
is an arguably poor and clearly inferior measure of Motiva's 
compliance with Subpart J. As the EPA points out, the 
unique chemical composition of the synthesis gas, in and of 
itself, does not and would not exempt the stationary gas 
turbines at issue here from regulation under Subpart J. 
This composition may suggest, however, that another 
regulation, for example, Subpart GG,15 regulating stationary 
gas turbines, rather than Subpart J, may be the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. 40 C.F.R. S 60.330, entitled"Applicability and Designation of Affected 
Facility," is the first section of Title 40, Subpart GG, and states in 
relevant part: 
 
       (a) The provisions of this subpart ar e applicable to the following 
       affected facilities: All stationary gas turbines with a heat input 
       at peak load equal to or greater than 10.7 gigajoules per hour, 
       based on the lower heating value of the fuel fir ed. 
 
       (b) Any facility under paragraph (a) of this section which 
       commences construction, modification, or r econstruction after 
       October 3, 1977, is subject to the requir ements of this part 
       . . . . 
 
40 C.F.R. S 60.330 (1999). It is undisputed by the parties that Subpart 
GG applies to the stationary gas turbines at issue in this case. The 
parties dispute only the applicability of Subpart J, which imposes much 
more stringent requirements than does Subpart GG on emissions from 
these stationary gas turbines. 
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appropriate regulation under which to r egulate emissions 
from these gas turbines. The discontinuity between the 
chemical composition of synthesis gas to be combusted at 
the Repowering Project and the chemical composition of 
other fuel gases, the combustion of which is subject to 
regulation under Subpart J, also suggests that the EPA's 
determination is "inconsistent with the r egulation" at issue 
and should be set aside.16 
 
D. EPA's Prior Determination Under Subpart OOO 
 
In arguing that its determination in this case is neither 
plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with Subpart J, the EPA 
relies in part on what it characterizes as a prior, analogous 
determination under Subpart OOO--Standar ds of 
Performance for Nonmetallic Mineral Pr ocessing Plants.17 
The EPA's reliance on this determination is misplaced for 
two reasons. 
 
First, while the factual background of the EP A's earlier 
determination under Subpart OOO is not entir ely clear (the 
record is incomplete), it is clear that the facts of this earlier 
determination are distinguishable, in at least one key 
respect, from the facts in this case. Unlike the stationary 
gas turbines at issue here, the Cement T reated Base plants 
located at nonmetallic mineral processing plants were 
portable. This fact alone distinguishes the EP A's prior 
determination under Subpart OOO because, as discussed 
above, physical location is the touchstone for deter mining 
which facilities are "affected facilities" as the term is defined 
in Subpart J. Because the Cement Treated Base plants at 
issue in this prior determination were portable, had the 
EPA concluded that these Cement Tr eated Base plants were 
subject to regulation under Subpart OOO based on their 
physical location, the regulatory framework established by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We further note that Motiva's inability to monitor and control the 
level of H2S and COS (prior to combustion) in the gas being combusted 
at the Repowering Project would take on heightened significance if it 
could be shown that monitoring the post-combustion SO2 emissions was 
more costly than monitoring the pre-combustion level of H2S in the 
synthesis gas at issue. 
 
17. See Standards of Perfor mance for Nonmetallic Mineral Processing 
Plants, 40 C.F.R. SS 60.670-60.676 (1999). 
 
                                23 
  
Subpart OOO could have been easily circumvented simply 
by moving the Cement Treated Base plants. Phrased 
differently, when portable facilities ar e at issue, physical 
location cannot possibly be the touchstone for deter mining 
if, and/or when, regulation is appropriate. This obvious 
consequence of portability is, of course, irr elevant in the 
present case because the gas turbines her e are stationary. 
 
Second, and more importantly, even assuming, arguendo, 
that the facts surrounding the prior deter mination under 
Subpart OOO and the present determination under 
Subpart J are sufficiently analogous, this in no way implies 
that the EPA's prior determination under Subpart OOO was 
either correct or consistent with Subpart OOO. Neither this 
Court nor any other court of which we are awar e has 
addressed the propriety and/or legality of this prior 
determination upon which the EPA r elies in part. As such, 
even assuming that the facts surrounding this prior 
determination under Subpart OOO and the pr esent 
determination under Subpart J are sufficiently analogous, 
we can only conclude from this that the EP A has addressed 
the issues consistently, not correctly.18 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It well-established, as a general proposition, that the 
EPA's interpretation of its own r egulations is entitled to 
"great deference." As the Supr eme Court stated in Udall v. 
Tallman: 
 
       When faced with a problem of statutory construction, 
       this Court shows great deference to the interpretation 
       given the statute by the officers or agency char ged with 
       its administration. . . . [Moreover, w]hen the 
       construction of an administrative regulation rather 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The parties argue extensively as to whether subjecting the stationary 
gas turbines at issue in this case to regulation under Subpart J would 
"yield . . . any environmental benefits." As discussed supra, we hold 
today that Subpart J is inapplicable to these stationary gas turbines 
because the turbines are not located "in" a "petroleum refinery." We 
therefore need not reach the question of whether subjecting the turbines 
at issue in this case to regulation under Subpart J would "yield . . . any 
environmental benefits." 
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       than a statute is in issue, deference is even more 
       clearly in order. 
 
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). Such deference, 
however, is not without limitations. The EP A determination 
at issue in this case seemingly ignores the r equirement, set 
forth at 40 C.F.R. S 60.100(a) (1999), that "affected 
facilities" regulated under Subpart J be located "in [a] 
petroleum refinery." In light of this, we conclude that the 
EPA's determination is both "plainly erroneous," and 
inconsistent with Subpart J. We will ther efore grant 
Motiva's petition for review and vacate the EP A's 
Determination. 
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